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CEO Duality and Firm Performance:
The Moderating Roles of CEO Informal Power and Board Involvements
Abstract
Purpose: This study draws on the resource dependence theory to synthesize the 
conflicting arguments as well as commonalities of the agency and stewardship 
perspectives on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.
Design/methodology/approach: Multiple regression analysis is used to analyze the 
data collected from a sample of 212 large scale publicly listed companies representing 
20 sectors in the Colombo Stock Exchange in Sri Lanka.
Research Findings/Insights: Results show, in support of agency theory, that CEO 
duality exerts a negative effect on firm performance when the CEO is equipped with 
additional informal power. Conversely, CEO duality exhibits a positive effect on firm 
performance when board involvements are high, a finding that supports the 
commonalities of the resource dependence and stewardship theoretical perspectives. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study expands the theoretical underpinning 
of corporate governance research by identifying the performance implications of CEO 
duality within the broad context of the resource provision of the board of directors 
and the informal power of CEOs. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: By examining the governance practices and 
concepts in an Asian developing economy, our study provides insight into the power 
dynamics between the CEO and the board of directors in managerial contexts that are 
largely different from those in Western countries.
Keywords: CEO duality, Board involvements, CEO informal power, Resource 
dependence theory
Paper type: Research paper
Page 1 of 51 Social Responsibility Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Social Responsibility Journal
2
1. Introduction
CEO duality, a situation in which one person holds both the CEO and the Chairman 
positions, has become an alarming issue following the recent failures of corporate 
giants in the early 2000s (Aktas et al., 2018; Duru et al., 2016; Krause et al., 2014; Yang 
and Zhao, 2014). Interestingly, among ten business giants that were confronted with 
corporate scandals, eight had CEO duality. While this finding has given the term a 
negative connotation, there is no consensus among researchers on how to interpret 
the evidence. Instead, largely due to contradictory assumptions underlying the agency 
and stewardship perspectives, the effect of CEO duality or non-duality on firm 
performance has been controversial both in academia and practice (e.g., Aktas et al., 
2018; Krause et al., 2014; Boyd, 1995; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994).
Overall, the empirical evidence on the relationship of CEO duality and firm 
performance has proven inconclusive (e.g., Duru et al., 2016; Yang and Zhao, 2014). 
Boyd (1995) summarized seven prominent corporate governance studies and realized 
that only two showed a negative impact whereas the other five showed positive or 
insignificant effects. Harris and Helfat (1998) found that out of thirteen researches, 
only three indicated negative effects while ten exhibited either positive or no effects. 
In addition, a substantial body of literature demonstrated that CEO duality is 
insignificantly related to firm performance (e.g., Benz and Frey, 2007; Daily and 
Dalton, 1992; Dalton et al., 1999). 
These findings reveal that “both agency theory (in favor of CEO non-duality 
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structure) and stewardship theory (in support of CEO duality structure) may be (only) 
valid under certain conditions” and that “existing theories might need to be treated as 
complementary viewpoints, each of which draws upon a part of the whole picture” 
(Elsayed, 2010, p. 80). Accordingly, an examination of the contexts where the concerns 
of both agency and stewardship theories can be identified becomes valuable.
With the exception of a few studies (e.g., Boyd, 1995; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 
1994), the literature thus far has paid little attention to contextual factors that may help 
explain inconsistent results stemming from the conflict between the agency and 
stewardship theories (Kim et al., 2009). A criticism of previous research is that its 
primary concern is “measuring the effect of duality on performance,” rather than 
“building a theoretical basis for understanding this relationship” (Boyd, 1995, p. 302). 
Another observation is that corporate governance research can be advanced when 
potentially contradictory theories can be simultaneously examined under specific 
contexts (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). The research also can be advanced when 
contingent factors that may interact with CEO duality and thus exercise influence on 
firm outcomes can be identified (Elsayed, 2010; Kim et al., 2009; Krause et al., 2014; 
Muth and Donaldson, 1998). 
To examine the moderating influence of contextual factors on the performance 
implications of CEO duality, we turn to the resource dependence theory which focuses 
on the relative power of the CEO and the power dynamics between the CEO and the 
board of directors (e.g., Krause et al., 2015; Lynall et al., 2003). Research has suggested 
Page 3 of 51 Social Responsibility Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Social Responsibility Journal
4
that the resource dependence perspective is advantageous for understanding the 
contingency contexts of boards and agency issues (Hillman et al., 2009). 
To explore the relative power of the CEO, we focus on CEO informal power because 
it is an essential, yet underexplored, factor that can strengthen the effects of CEO 
duality (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). To examine the power dynamics between the 
CEO and the board of directors, we highlight the role of various board involvements, 
since a focus on the resource provisions of the board balances the emphasis of 
previous studies on its monitoring role (Daily et al., 2003; Krause et al., 2015)). Indeed, 
due to the limited results obtained from the agency theory, research has suggested 
that “rather than focusing predominantly on directors' willingness or ability to control 
executives, in future research scholars may yield more productive results by focusing 
on the assistance directors provide in bringing valued resources to the firm and in 
serving as a source of advice and counsel for CEOs” (Hillam et al., 2009, p. 1410).
To further characterize the informal power of CEOs, we highlight their family 
ties, a critical business concern in the Eastern context (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004), and 
their participation in board subcommittees, a widely-recognized Western governance 
issue (Jackling and Johl, 2009). Prior research has proposed the need to identify such 
additional involvement, including CEO “appointments,” as potential sources of 
power (Greve and Mitsuhashi, 2007, p. 1216). Our study responds to this call, in part, 
by focusing on family control, a common business practice especially in the Asian 
context. CEOs with family ties have managerial and symbolic roles that contribute to 
Page 4 of 51Social Responsibility Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Social Responsibility Journal
5
their implicit and explicit power over the board, and allow them considerable freedom 
to set their own agenda and decide on resource allocations and strategic decisions 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). In addition, our study also considers their 
membership in subcommittees, since this involvement can directly advance their 
influence over board decisions. A CEO who holds a position on the board will possess 
more power through interacting with internal and external actors (cf., Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni, 1994). Research has also shown that a CEO’s multiple board appointments 
can affect a firm’s value (Ferris et al., 2003; Harris and Shimizu, 2004). 
As to board involvements, we evaluate the board’s shareholdings (Kim et al., 
2009) and frequency of board meetings (Jackling and Johl, 2009; Vafeas, 1999) because 
these factors explicate the degree to which boards are motivated to participate in 
business operations. Prior studies have recognized the importance of board vigilance 
(Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994) and board shareholdings (Kim et al., 2009). A board 
with a great number of shares in a company has significant interests in the firm and 
thus is more likely to perform a vigilant role (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). In 
addition, the frequency of board meetings can influence a firm’s resource capacity and 
ultimately its financial performance by expanding the cognitive bases of CEOs and 
extending the advice and counsel channels of the firm (cf., Smith et al., 1994). Thus, a 
significant indicator of board activities is the frequency of board meetings (Vafeas, 
1999). 
In a nutshell, this study aims to integrate the resource dependence perspective 
with the agency and stewardship theories in order to identify the contexts where CEO 
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duality may advance or diminish firm performance. Such a multitheoretic approach 
recognizes the conflicting as well as “the commonalities of the theoretical 
perspectives,” and further suggests that agency concerns can be interpreted by board 
practices (Lynall et al., 2003, p. 428) and CEO informal power (Boyd, 1995). 
To examine these issues, we collected data from 212 publicly-listed firms in Sri 
Lanka. The examination of corporate governance issues in a non-Western country is 
important, because “the underlying conditions for companies to adhere with good 
corporate governance principles vary with institutional and country differences” 
(Holm and Scholer, 2010, pp. 32-33). Moreover, the recognition of contextual factors 
in CEO duality research is especially promising in the Asian context, because “the 
process by which the CEO affects firm performance has not yet been addressed in the 
literature” (Bruton and Lau, 2008, p. 654). Interestingly, few studies which have been 
carried out in the Sri Lankan context investigating this phenomenon have also arrived 
conflicting findings. For instance, although Azeez (2015) revealed that the separation 
of the two posts of CEO and chairman has a significant positive relationship with the 
firm performance, Dharmadasa et al. (2014) found no significant relationship between 
these two variables.
Our study expands the theoretical underpinning of corporate governance 
research by identifying the performance implications of CEO duality within the broad 
context of the board of directors’ ability to provide resources and the CEO’s informal 
power. By examining the theory and practice of corporate governance in a developing 
economy, the study also advances the generalizability of governance research (Bruton 
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and Lau, 2008; McCarthy and Puffer, 2008). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
theoretical background and literature review. Section three proposes hypotheses of 
the study. Section four discusses the methods followed by the results presented in the 
section five. The final section concludes the paper by highlighting the theoretical and 
practical contribution, and directions for future research. 
2. Theoretical Background
Research has proposed that neither agency nor stewardship theory can clearly 
determine the outcomes of CEO duality (Boyd, 1995). Moreover, both agency and 
stewardship theories overlook the dynamic nature of corporate governance and thus 
fail to reveal the underlying governance mechanisms (Elsayed, 2010). Our study 
intends to fill these gaps by employing the resource dependence theory to explore 
moderating mechanisms on the effects of CEO duality, and thus synthesize the 
findings of these two theoretical perspectives. 
2.1 Agency Theory and the Need for Complementary Perspectives
The agency theory argues that separating the CEO and chairman positions 
enhances the transparency and accountability of firm decisions, which increases 
shareholders’ trust and ultimately firm performance (Adams et al., 2005; Gillan, 2006; 
Kroll et al., 2008). This perspective favors CEO non-duality because a dual-position 
CEO may become a “self-serving, economically rational” person (Corbetta and 
Salvato, 2004, p. 357), especially when the CEO has family ties or board committee 
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appointments. In this regard, it is worthwhile noting that, while there may be many 
reasons for a firm to choose CEO duality, no evidence thus far shows that CEO duality 
is intentionally designed with the purpose of optimizing firm performance (Iyengar 
and Zampelli, 2009). Under circumstances in which CEO duality is present, the agency 
perspective relies heavily on the monitoring functions of board of directors and 
expects the board to mitigate the potentially negative effects of power imbalance 
(Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994).
Notwithstanding the potential for managerial abuse under CEO duality, such a 
negative interpretation of duality has been questioned because business practices and 
empirical findings show that such abuses tend not to occur, or their occurrence cannot 
be presumed.  In fact, duality may encourage a CEO to be a “self actualizing, collective 
serving” person (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004, p. 357; Boyd, 1995). Thus, the quest for 
integrating other theories into the agency perspective to explain the impact of CEO 
duality on firm performance has gained momentum. Davis et al. (1997, p. 20-21) have 
proposed that “although agency theory addresses manager-principal interest 
divergence, additional theory is needed to explain what, if anything, causes interests 
to be aligned.” In addition, Corbetta and Salvato (2004, p. 356) suggest that, although 
agency theory is a suitable mechanism for illustrating organizational relationships in 
efficient ways, “what is missing is a conceptual lens to explain behaviors aimed at 
maximizing potential performance within organizations in which a pro-
organizational attitude coexists with self-serving motives.” An integrated 
consideration of agency theory and other perspectives, such as the well-recognized 
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stewardship and resource dependence theories, can help explain previous opposing 
results and expand the applicability of the agency theory (Dalton et al., 2003). 
The adoption of agency theory can be justified by the features of institutional and 
regulatory framework within which the companies govern in Sri Lanka. For instance, 
it has a properly laid down system which promotes private sector investments 
through the Colombo Stock Exchange. Further, the Companies Act and the other 
regulations, and codes of corporate governance in Sri Lanka are largely based on those 
of international laws, regulations and codes of best practice in corporate governance 
(Wijethilake et al., 2015). Furthermore, Sri Lanka was a colony from the early 16th 
century until 1948, when it gained independence from the British. Hence, corporate 
governance in Sri Lanka have been closely associated with the colonial ties and 
economic spheres (Ekanayake, 2011). For example, most of the laws and regulations 
related to the governing of companies are based on those of the British.
On the other hand, nature of the ownership of the companies in Sri Lanka 
supports the adoption of the stewardship theory. For instance, a considerable number 
of Sri Lankan companies have family ties and concentrated share ownerships 
(Wijethilake et al., 2015). This could influence the informal power of the CEO, and the 
involvement of the board via larger shareholdings.
2.2. An Evaluation of the Stewardship Theory
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Contrary to the conceptualizations of agency theory, stewardship theory defines 
situations where executives are not concerned for their own interests, but rather 
behave as stewards in advancing the benefits of the entire organization (Davis et al., 
1997). While agency theory promotes a control-oriented perspective, an involvement-
oriented standpoint encourages empowerment, decentralised decision making and 
interactive management style (Davis et al., 1997; Van Thiel, 2016). More specifically, 
stewardship theory emphasises on practices and processes that enable and inspire 
instead of monitoring and controlling.
As per the conflicting opinion suggested by the stewardship theory, which 
establishes that the integration of the CEO and chairman roles would improve 
performance, CEO duality is a positive instrument to exploit firm information in an 
effective way as the CEO is well conscious of organisational functions (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). This distinctive feature is 
an answer in settings where information asymmetry arises between the CEO and the 
chairman. This perspective proposes that CEO duality can “facilitate effective action 
by the CEO, and consequently lead to higher performance” (Boyd, 1995, p. 304). 
Proponents of the stewardship theory also maintain that goal alignment and 
trustworthiness between principal and agent considerably decreases the potential of 
selfish conduct. Accordingly, this minimizes forceful supervising, which may be 
observed as an indication of mistrust, resulting resistance between principal and agent 
(Van Thiel, 2016). 
Here again, a number of scholars have expressed serious reservations about these 
Page 10 of 51Social Responsibility Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Social Responsibility Journal
11
arguments. A fairly recent study has maintained that “stewardship and stakeholder 
theory remove some restrictive assumptions of the agency approach, yet do not 
provide a comprehensive research framework that links corporate governance with 
the broader context of different organizational environments” (Agruilera et al., 2008, 
p. 478). Because CEO duality and non-duality do not show significant differences in 
long-term firm performance, an oblique favor of duality is largely inadequate (Baliga 
et al., 1996). Instead, identifying the contexts where stewardship or agency perspective 
can function well is potentially more insightful (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007). 
Chrisman (2019) argues that although the stewardship theory is used as an alternative 
to agency theory, the theory does not provide clear presumptions on bounded 
rationality and pre employment scenarios as neglect of such mattes decreases its 
realism and relevance. Accordingly, underlying assumptions of stewardship theory 
should to be revisited to increase its realism and relevance (Chrisman, 2019).
2.3 The Role of the Resource Dependence Theory
The foregoing discussion of CEO duality does not go so far as to determine the actual 
situations in which specific theories might apply; rather, it outlines mixed results that 
stem from conflicting theories. Thus, our study addresses the resource dependence 
theory to explicate the dynamics between the CEO and the board of directors in an 
attempt to shed light on the different contexts in which specific theories might 
function to advantage.    
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Research has shown that, although resource dependence theory is “less 
commonly used to study boards than agency theory, empirical evidence to date 
suggests that it is a more successful lens for understanding boards” (Hillman et al., 
2009, p. 1408). The advantage of resource dependence theory pertains to its ability to 
help “illuminate boards’ composition in both the collective and formalization stages 
of the organizational life cycle, when CEOs have dominant power” (Lynall et al., 2003, 
p. 427). In contrast to the agency perspective, the resource dependence theory 
proposes that resource provision, rather than monitoring, is the key function of a 
board (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Krause et al., 2016). Corporate boards are chosen “to 
maximize the provision of important resources to the firm” and each director is 
expected to “bring different linkages and resources to a board” (Lynall et al., 2003, p. 
418). Accordingly, the frequency of board meetings and directors’ equity holdings can 
be considered as a resource provision, rather than actions of scrutiny and enforcement 
(Dalton et al., 2003). Similarly, a CEO with informal power such as family relationships 
and board committee appointments may expand a company’s network and cognitive 
resources and thus become an impetus of the firm (cf., Eddleston and Kellermanns, 
2007).
While the resource dependence theory has been the dominant approach to 
understand the existence of active boards for many years (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), 
it is acknowledged that more recently the social network theory has supplemented the 
contribution of resource dependence theory (Westphal, 1999; Carpenter and 
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Westphal, 2001). Social network theory recognizes important board roles as 
networking, cohesion and exchange of information, door-opening, legitimacy, and 
communication in internal relations (Gulati and Westphal, 1999; Westphal, 1999; 
Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). 
As the resource dependence theory views the board as an administrative body 
that connects the organisation and with its external environment, this approach is 
more suitable to understand the board behaviour in the Sri Lankan context as 
compared to social network theory. In particular, this is important given the nature of 
Sri Lankan national and business culture mainly dominated by Asian values and 
beliefs, and the emerging nature of most of the business establishments. Further, 
viewing the board’s role from the resource dependence perspective can be 
rationalized as it reduces organization’s reliance on external stakeholders or help to 
defend the organisation from various external pressures.
3. Hypotheses
The effect of CEO duality on firm performance remains inconclusive. Our study 
intends to shed light on the conflicting results by examining the moderating effects of 
CEO informal power and various board involvements.
3.1 Moderating Effects of CEO Informal Power
The informal power of executives is not “necessarily associated with formal structure” 
(Peiro and Melia, 2003, p. 19). Research has shown that the power of CEOs generated 
from informal mechanisms plays the most significant role among the factors that 
Page 13 of 51 Social Responsibility Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Social Responsibility Journal
14
contribute to firm performance (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). 
3.2 CEOs with family ties
Family ties refer to appointments in which the appointment member is related to the 
founder of the firm or acts as a representative of family share ownerships (Anderson 
et al., 2003). Finkelstein (1992) posited that executives who are closely related to the 
founder can exercise control over the board. Again, Barkema and Pennings (1998) 
found that when CEOs have informal power acquired through family ties, they have 
greater opportunities to dominate the board.  They can also affect the composition of 
board members (Lynall et al., 2003) and thus shrunk the board’s monitoring process. 
Consequently, in accordance with the agency perspective, scholars argue that in 
situations where family ties exist, the greater the CEO duality, the more likely it is that 
the CEO will shape firm strategies to advance personal interests (Greve and 
Mitsuhashi, 2007; Beavers, 2017). Supporting this argument is the study of Anderson 
and Reeb (2004), who found that firms with strong founding-family ownership have 
considerably worse performance than non-family firms. Bennedsen et al. (2007) also 
found that family successions of CEO have a large negative causal impact on firm 
performance. Moreover, Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) showed that when CEOs 
possess more informal power, they tend to build an entrenchment in order to protect 
their individual interests. 
Nonetheless, Mooney et al. (2007) revealed that, compared to the appointment of 
non-family CEOs whose failure rate could be up to 55%, the failure rate of family-
appointed CEOs did not exceed 34%. Anderson and Reeb (2003) found family firms 
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perform better than nonfamily firms. Also, they revealed that when family members 
serve as CEO, performance is better than with outside CEOs. However, Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) revealed that family ownership creates value only when the founder 
serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO (i.e., when 
descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed). Anderson et al. (2003) found that 
founding family ownership leads to a lower cost of debt financing. In contrast to 
agency theory, the stewardship and resource dependence perspectives indicate that 
family participation can provide a firm with unique resources such as social capital 
and interpersonal network—resources that can create value for a firm and ultimately 
improve financial performance (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007). Research has 
identified family participation as a critical resource of a firm, because it can advance 
honor and altruism “that encourages family members to place the firm's objectives 
ahead of their own” (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007, p. 547). These results indicate 
that CEO duality can help a firm achieve better performance when family ties are 
involved, because family appointed CEOs will consider not only their in-role but also 
extra-role duties and be motivated to relinquish opportunistic concerns (Davis et al., 
1997). 
The foregoing arguments have presented different and opposing perspectives on 
the effect of a CEO’s family representation. Accordingly, this study develops the 
following competing hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1a: As indicated by the agency theory, a CEO’s family ties will worsen the 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.
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Hypothesis 1b: As indicated by the stewardship and resource dependence theories, a CEO’s 
family ties will improve the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.
   
3.3. The participation of CEOs in board subcommittees
The extent to which a CEO can acquire certain power by holding memberships in 
board committees is identified as CEO busyness (Jackling and Johl, 2009). According 
to the agency perspective, when dual–appointed CEOs hold more positions, they have 
more opportunities to dominate the boards and thus diminish the function of the 
boards (Finkelstein, 1992). A growing body of research has criticized CEOs’ board 
participation, because it can make the decisions of board subcommittees lose 
transparency and accountability (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). As this criticism 
holds, the non-independent pressure of CEOs on independent board decisions can be 
detrimental to corporate outcomes. Research argued that “CEOs often have access to 
sources of power that allow them to manipulate their pay at the expense of (other) 
shareholders,” a typical case when a CEO holds more positions on board 
subcommittees (Barkema and Pennings, 1998, p. 980). Research also supports this 
view by showing that while duality alone does not have a direct impact on the stock 
market, once CEO acquires another title in the board, the stock market reacts adversely 
(Worrell et al., 1998). Further, CEOs with a number of committee appointments need 
to reallocate their time, which can distract them from routine functions and strategic 
focus, and lead to poor performance.
Conversely, the stewardship and resource dependence perspectives assert that a 
dual-position CEO with more board appointments will have more opportunities to 
Page 16 of 51Social Responsibility Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Social Responsibility Journal
17
engage with the external environment, which can create more avenues to access 
resources and thus increase firm values (cf., Jackling and Johl, 2009). The internal and 
external networks created through the active involvement of CEOs in board decisions 
can spontaneously advance their experiences and breadth of perspectives, which then 
enhance a firm’s adaptability (Lynall et al., 2003). Research has shown that directors 
with multiple appointments have a positive impact on corporate performance (Ferris 
et al., 2003; Harris and Shimizu, 2004; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011; Masulis and Mobbs, 
2014). In a similar vein, the effectiveness of CEOs holding several positions on 
independent board subcommittees can be advanced because these CEOs tend to view 
themselves as stewards of firm performance (cf., Barkema and Pennings, 1998). 
Hypothesis 2a: As indicated by the agency theory, a CEO’s participation in board 
subcommittees will worsen the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.
Hypothesis 2b: As indicated by the stewardship and resource dependence theories, a CEO’s 
participation in board subcommittees will improve the relationship between CEO duality 
and firm performance.
3.4 Moderating Effects of Board Involvements
As per the agency theory, the role of the board is to monitor management in order to 
ensure that shareholders’ interests are secured (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Accordingly, Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) define board vigilance as a motivation 
and incentive to effectively monitor and discipline CEOs. Their study argues that 
board vigilance can oversee the risks associated with management and strategic 
decisions, and thus help a dual-position CEO advance firm performance. A case in 
point is the Enron scandal and bankruptcy of the Enron corporation, which may have 
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been avoided had its board been more agile (Gillan and Martin, 2007).  However, 
greater board control over a CEO’s functions can hurt firm performance by adversely 
affecting the CEO’s willingness and motivation to generate strategic options in the 
focal company (McDonald and Westphal, 2010). Research has suggested that “the 
greater the power of the board in relation to its existing CEO, the greater the likelihood 
of change in CEO characteristics when succession occurs” (Zajac and Westphal, 1996, 
p. 69). It follows that when the efficiency of the board’s involvement outweighs the 
agency cost brought by opportunistic behaviors, the adverse effect of CEO duality on 
firm performance, as proposed by agency theory, will be altered. The focus on the 
power dynamics between the CEO and the board, as advocated by the resource 
dependence theory, can look into the effectiveness of CEO duality from both the 
controlling and collaborative viewpoints (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003), and thus 
synthesize the agency and stewardship perspectives. 
3.5 Board Shareholdings
A board with high equity ownership will be greatly motivated to get involved in the 
company’s decisions and help build a firewall to reject actions that may hurt firm 
performance (Kim et al., 2009). Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) maintain that a non-
shareholding board tends to allow its CEO to make firm decisions based on individual 
initiatives. Conversely, boards with a large shareholding will closely monitor the 
agenda-setting of CEOs and take appropriate measures to protect the interests of 
shareholders, which ultimately will affect the duality or non-duality structure of the 
CEO position (Elsayed, 2010). Board ownership is also an indication of the level of 
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stewardship toward the firm. Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003, p. 398) highlight the 
prominence of equity ownership among executives and the board in promoting firm 
performance. They reason that executive ownership “reduces goal conflicts and 
avoids increasing risk differentials,” while it also “fosters firm identifications and long 
term relations.” A board with minority equity holdings is less likely to monitor CEO’s 
opportunistic behaviors, which will then incline toward the pursuit of personal 
interests at the expenses of shareholders’ benefits (Lasfer, 2006; Hoskisson et al., 2002). 
To summarize the arguments that have been made, we propose that a board with 
a high level of ownership will be more motivated to exercise its role in monitoring 
management and providing resources to the firm. Consequently, regardless of 
whether the issue is considered from the agency or stewardship perspective, we 
expect board shareholdings to drive CEO duality in a direction that advances firm 
value. 
Hypothesis 3: Board shareholdings will positively moderate the relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance. Specifically, the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance will be improved when board shareholdings are high. 
 
3.6 Frequency of Board Meetings
Among board activities, board meetings play a significant role because they allow 
board members to make collective decisions and initiate appropriate measures to 
implement strategic decisions and thereby mitigate CEO dominance. The resource 
dependence theory asserts that frequent board meetings can prompt the board to 
exercise its functions in relation to corporate activities and provide the board with a 
mechanism to correct potentially adverse actions brought by CEO duality (Jackling 
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and Johl, 2009). A dual-position CEO may tend to control the board agenda by holding 
few board meetings (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). The board of directors can 
exercise appropriate management control and scrutinize poor performance by 
holding frequent board meetings and thus increase corporate performance (Jackling 
and Johl, 2009). 
Research has concluded that, by exercising both controlling and collaborative 
strategies (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003), boards can advance the links between a 
dual-position CEO and board members through the frequency of their meetings. In 
this way, they can also advance the relations between a firm and external stakeholder, 
and thus increase the firm’s information-processing capacity and internal and external 
social capital (cf., Muth and Donaldson, 1998), all of which can create benefits for the 
firm. 
Hypothesis 4: The frequency of board meetings will positively moderate the relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance. Specifically, the relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance will be improved when the frequency of board meetings is 
high. 
4. Methods
4.1 Research Design and Sample Selection
The sample of this study was drawn from publicly-listed companies in the Colombo 
Stock Exchange (CSE) of Sri Lanka in 2009. As a developing economy in Asia, Sri 
Lanka provides the corporate governance literature with a different institutional 
context and thus is expected to add new insights into previous Western-focused 
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studies (Bruton and Lau, 2008). All listed corporations in the CSE are required to 
follow the listed rules and amended corporate governance guidelines introduced by 
the CSE, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Sri Lanka (ICASL). We excluded eighteen firms who were in financial 
predicament in 2007-2009. Specifically, we excluded those companies that were 
temporarily delisted in the stock exchange, failed to submit annual reports for a given 
period of time, lacked sufficient study information, or registered or went bankrupt 
during our study period. 
In total, 212 listed companies were finally selected, representing 100% of the 
active firms in the CSE during the fiscal years. The 212 firms were spread over 20 
industries. 31 firms (14.6%) were in banking and finance, 28 (13.21%) were in hotels 
and travelling and another 28 (31.21%) were in manufacturing. Average firm age was 
29.96 years, while the average number of full-time employees was 1,790 persons. Table 
1 illustrates the summary of our firms’ industry characteristics. 
4.2 Measures
Independent and Dependent Variables
CEO duality: Data were collected from the annual reports of the publicly-listed 
companies in the 2008/2009 fiscal year. CEO duality is a binary variable; a firm with 
duality was coded “1” while non-duality was coded “0” (Boyd, 1995; Finkelstein and 
Insert Table 1 about here
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D’Aveni, 1994).
Earnings per share (EPS): EPS was used to assess firm performance because it can 
largely explain the functions performed by executives and boards. Previous research 
has used this measure to examine the effect of CEO duality on firm performance 
(Iyengar and Zampelli, 2009). 
Moderating Variables
CEO informal power: Family ties and participation in board subcommittees were used 
to capture CEO informal power. We measured the family ties of CEOs by whether the 
CEO was a family member or relative of the founder with same last name or family 
name (Finkelstein, 1992). If the CEO was a family member, code “1” was assigned, 
and otherwise code “0.” Participation in oard subcommittees was assessed by a 
CEO’s membership representation in audit, nomination, or remuneration committees 
(Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Jackling and Johl, 2009). If a CEO participated in one 
of these subcommittees, code “1” was assigned; otherwise, it was code “0.” 
Board involvements: Board shareholdings and the frequency of board meetings 
were used to evaluate board involvements. The former was measured by the 
percentage of a board’s total shares divided by the company’s outstanding shares 
(Kim et al., 2009). The frequency of board meetings was measured by the number of 
board meetings held during the 2008/2009 financial year (Jackling and Johl, 2009).
Control Variables 
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To guard against spurious results, several executive-level and firm-level variables 
were also controlled in the model. The evaluation of executive-level controls included 
CEO tenure and the number of board members, board subcommittees, and executive 
team members. CEO tenure was measured as the number of years that a CEO was 
employed by the firm (Kim et al., 2009). Research has shown that long-tenure CEOs 
are more likely to have poor performance (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009). The 
number of board members, including independent, non-executive, and executive 
directors, was also controlled in order to avoid the bias presented by the influence of 
different types of directors on the informal power and decision making of CEOs. 
Moreover, from the boards’ viewpoint, controlling these variables allowed a 
distinction to be made between the resource provision of the board and its monitoring 
and controlling activities (Henry, 2009; McDonald and Westphal, 2010). The number 
of independent directors was calculated as the total number of outside directors 
(Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). To avoid the influence of the chairman’s busyness on 
CEO duality and CEO busyness, we controlled for the former by taking into account 
the chairman’s multi-directorships in board subcommittees.  The number of board 
subcommittees was also controlled, because it may confound the effects of the 
frequency of board meetings. The availability of board subcommittees was measured 
as the total of audit, remuneration, and nomination committees that were reported 
under the governance statement in the annual report (Reeb and Upadhyay, 2010). 
Finally, the number of executive team members (i.e., executive team size), including 
CEO and senior executives who report directly to the CEO, was controlled because it 
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has a significant effect on firm performance (Lin and Shih, 2008).
For firm-level controls, we include firm age, firm size, prior performance, firm 
slack, and industry segments. Firm age and firm size, which captured organizational 
maturity (Matta and Beamish, 2008), were calculated as the natural logarithm of a 
firm’s founding years and the number of full-time employees (Ahmed et al., 2006). 
Prior performance, measured by the natural logarithms of EPS in the 2007/2008 fiscal 
year, was controlled since it directly influences a CEO’s perception of firm 
performance and the board of directors’ involvement (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; 
Kim et al., 2009). The logarithmic form of analysis was applied to reduce 
heteroscedasticity (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). Firm slack was measured by firm 
leverage and current ratio, in which leverage was calculated as long-term debt divided 
by total assets (Ahmed et al., 2006) while current ratio was calculated as current assets 
divided by current liabilities (Jaggi and Gul, 2001). Finally, industry was controlled by 
being classified into three segments (i.e., of manufacturing, service and others), since 
research has shown that CEO duality varies with industry characteristics (Boyd, 1995; 
Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994).
4.3 Analyses
A hierarchical regression analysis was applied to examine our theoretically-derived 
hypotheses. In the first step, control variables were entered into the model. The effect 
of CEO duality was tested in the second model while moderators were examined in 
the third model. Finally, the two-way interaction terms were assessed in model four. 
To test the interaction effects, we mean-centered our independent and moderating 
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variables and created four multiplicative terms so as to reduce the likelihood of 
multicollinearity (Aiken and West, 1991). We also used the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) to evaluate the effects of multicollinearity. Results showed that VIFs for the 
independent variables ranged from 1.1 to 4.0, while for the interaction terms they 
ranged from 1.2 to 1.7, indicating that multicollinearity was largely unlikely to bias 
the regression results. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and the 
intercorrelation coefficients of our variables. Significant correlations between the 
studied variables provide preliminary evidence for further examinations.
5. Results
Hypothesis 1a and 1b
Table 3 presents the regression results. As shown in model 4, the coefficient for the 
interaction between duality and family ties is negatively significant (β= -.139, t= -2.01, 
p< .05).  Thus, hypothesis 1a is supported, and hypothesis 1b is unsupported.  A CEO’s 
family ties tend to worsen the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance, a result that is consistent with the agency prediction. Figure 1 depicts 
the interaction plot which supports the interpretation. Consequently, we maintain that 
it is unwise to appoint a CEO who has family ties to the firm to take the board chair 
position. 
           
Insert Table 2 about here
Insert Table 3 about here
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Hypothesis 2a and 2b
Model 4 in Table 3 also showed that the coefficient for the interaction between duality 
and participation in board committees is negatively significant (β= -.141, t= -2.17, p < 
.05). Therefore, hypothesis 2a is supported, and hypothesis 2b is unsupported. A CEO 
who holds positions on board subcommittees will adversely affect the relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance, as the agency theory proposes. Figure 2 
presents the interaction plot which confirms this prediction. We conclude that the 
stewardship and resource dependence perspectives are not valid when a dual-
position CEO also participates in subcommittees.  
  
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 predicted that board shareholdings would positively moderate the effect 
of CEO duality on firm performance. As hypothesized, the interaction term between 
shareholdings and duality in Model 4 is positively significant (β= .128, t= 2.17, p< .05). 
As Figure 3 shows, plotting the interactions terms further supports the clarification. 
Accordingly, this study affirms that the equity holdings of boards of directors can 
support duality to improve firm performance.
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 predicted that frequency of board meetings would positively moderate 
Insert Figure 1 about here
Insert Figure 2 about here
Insert Figure 3 about here
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the effect of CEO duality on firm performance. As expected, the regression coefficient 
for the interaction term in Model 4 is positively significant (β= .133, t= 1.94, p< .10), a 
finding that supports hypothesis 4. Plotting the interaction terms in Figure 4 depicts 
this finding. As shown, the frequency of board meetings can support duality to 
improve firm performance.
5.2 Post Hoc Checks: Control, Independent, and Moderating Variables
Although we do not focus on their direct effects, we are interested in the effects of 
executive-level and firm-level factors on firm performance, especially since our 
research may be among the first of the few studies in this country that explore various 
determinants of ultimate firm performance. 
Model 1 examined the effects of control variables, which can explain a total of 
37% of the variances in firm performance. CEO tenure, the number of executive and 
non-executive directors, and debt ratio showed negative effects on firm performance, 
while executive team size, current ratio, and past performance showed positive 
effects. 
Model 2 tested the direct relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance. The result showed that CEO duality has a positive yet insignificant 
relationship with firm performance (β= .075, t= 1.20). Nonetheless, CEO duality 
positively affected firm performance in Model 3 (β= .183, t= 1.98, p> .05) and Model 4 
Insert Figure 4 about here
Page 27 of 51 Social Responsibility Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Social Responsibility Journal
28
(β= .294, t= 2.72 p< .01) when the moderators were included in the model. These results, 
combined with the significantly positive effects of board shareholdings and frequency 
of board meetings in Model 3, revealed that even though CEO duality itself has little 
impact on firm performance, it can bring value to a firm when the CEO has the 
resource support of the board of directors.
6. Discussion
The central objective of this study was to examine the moderating effects of CEO 
informal power and board involvements on the relationship between CEO duality and 
firm performance in an attempt to explain the conflicting as well as the commonalities 
of the results obtained by the agency and stewardship perspectives.  Specifically, we 
drew on the resource dependence theory to resolve the apparent discrepancy between 
these two theoretical orientations, thereby eliminating the ‘black box’ in the duality-
performance relationship. 
In line with prior literature, we found that no significant relationship exists 
between CEO duality and firm performance. Thus, identifying the contexts that can 
determine the effectiveness of duality or non-duality becomes imperative. In this 
sense, the literature is correct in maintaining that neither the agency nor stewardship 
model can properly predict the duality-performance relationship (Boyd, 1995). 
Nonetheless, an examination of this relationship from a contingency perspective can 
bring significant insights to the issue regarding CEO duality and corporate 
governance (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). More specifically, our study has expanded 
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the theoretical underpinning of corporate governance research by introducing the 
resource dependence theory to integrate the opposing arguments of the agency and 
stewardship perspectives. By examining the CEO duality issue in Sri Lanka, our study 
has also extended the theoretical applications of corporate governance to countries 
where governing mechanisms are largely incomplete.
6.1 Theoretical Implications 
This study has significant implications for the agency and stewardship theories. The 
results indicate that CEO duality is favored under high board involvement, while non-
duality is preferred when the CEO has family ties or board subcommittee 
appointments. Specifically, both the CEO’s family involvement and participation in 
board subcommittees has a weakening effect on the duality-performance relationship. 
This finding supports the agency position by showing that duality is negatively 
associated with firm performance in situations where informal power also exists.  Our 
finding also indicates that the separation of management and ownership is the key in 
current business. If a CEO holds too much power, either formally or informally, he/she 
is more likely to pursue individual interests, which will hurt firm performance. Thus, 
CEO appointments should be a strategic issue in family or non-family businesses, 
because they can greatly impact a firm’s market value.
Conversely, a high level of board involvement contributes to the positive effect 
that CEO duality can have on firm performance, since the board is equipped to 
provide the resources required to advance firm value. As our study results indicate, 
in situations where board involvement is considerably high, the advantages of CEO 
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duality outweigh non-duality, a finding that supports the study of Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni (1994) who found that board vigilance was positively associated with CEO 
duality. Specifically, when board members are proactively involved in strategic 
decision-making, agency abuses are reduced and agency costs minimized by the 
board’s resource provisions. 
These findings are interesting because resource dependence theory plays a major 
role in distinguishing between the benefits and concerns of both duality and non-
duality. When the resource dependence theory is integrated only with the 
stewardship theory (hypotheses 1b and 2b), the duality-performance relationship is 
adversely affected. However, when resource dependence theory is integrated with 
agency and stewardship theories (hypotheses 2 and 3), the duality-performance 
relationship is advanced. Thus, as the resource dependence perspective shows, 
providing resources to the firm through various avenues can benefit or hurt 
performance; the power attributions of executives hold the key. The performance 
implications of CEO duality can be examined by considering the relative power of the 
CEO and the power dynamics between the CEO and the board of directors. 
6.2 Practical Implications
This study has also generated several implications that have relevance for 
practitioners. First, it should be noted that CEO duality or non-duality is not built into 
the CEO’s official position. Therefore, it is unwise, and indeed impossible, to 
determine whether duality outperforms non-duality simply from a structural 
perspective. Whether to adopt duality or non-duality requires taking into account 
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other types of power and resources that CEOs and boards may possess. Second, with 
respect to corporate board structure, a premium should be put on the resource 
provisions and involvement of the board so that increased firm performance can be 
achieved. Agency problems often occur when key decision makers other than the CEO 
have minimal or no financial interests or involvement in the consequences of their 
decisions (Boyd, 1995; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Finally, from the policy-making 
standpoint, internal corporate policies should be strengthened so that directors can be 
more involved in corporate decisions and actions.
Overall, the findings convey a clear warning to companies where CEO is 
equipped with additional informal power. As shown, economic performance of such 
companies is more likely to be negatively affected by such practices. Yet, how the 
board performs their fiduciary duties in these companies has a major implication on 
their long-term performance. Companies in Sri Lanka need to understand the power 
dynamics between CEO and board of directors to minimize negative consequences 
(see Uddin et al., 2017). This is particularly important as the ownership of most of the 
companies is concentrated as compared to that of companies in the western advanced 
economies.
6.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
This study uses a multitheoretical approach that makes use of the resource 
dependence theory to resolve the theoretical and empirical conflicts between the 
agency and stewardship perspectives. Such an integrated examination is beneficial 
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“because depending on just one single perspective is more likely to result in 
misleading conclusions about the structure as a whole” (Elsayesd, 2010, p. 80). 
However, the integration of these three theories does not reveal the whole scope of 
progress in corporate governance. Future research can advance the governance 
research by combining other points of view. For example, an integrated consideration 
of social network theory, stakeholder theory, and institutional theory may help 
resolve other controversial issues by identifying the boundary conditions that favor 
CEO duality or non-duality. 
Secondly, care should be taken to interpret results presented in the study as it 
only reports a sample of 212 companies in one-year period. It is suggested that future 
studies may consider a relatively larger size of sample with multiple years as well as 
different measurements of variables. Thirdly, although the sample was collected from 
all publicly-listed companies in an Asian developing economy, which increases the 
applicability of corporate governance research, the generalization of findings requires 
that studies be conducted in other countries where managerial mechanisms and 
environments are similar to our study context. It may also be worthwhile to compare 
such applications between countries. Indeed, corporate governance research can be 
expanded by comparing different viewpoints in diverse institutional contexts 
(Aguilera et al., 2008).
Finally, as Bruton and Lau (2008) suggested, it is advisable to conduct a 
multilevel analysis rather than just a firm-level examination, since this will reveal the 
extent to which corporate governance applications vary in developed and developing 
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countries. 
In summary, an integrated analysis of the resource dependence, agency, and 
stewardship perspectives, which identifies the contexts where CEO duality can 
function well and where non-duality is preferred, has offered critical insights for a 
diverse range of research topics and business practices. Our study highlights board 
involvement as a facilitator and informal executive power as an inhibitor of the 
positive effects that CEO duality can have on firm market-based performance.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Information of Study Sample
Firms
Industry Segments
Total Sample
Market 
Capitalization
Market 
Turnover 
Rate
CEO 
Duality 
(%)
Trading 9 7 1.0 22.27 63
Hotels and Travels 32 28 7.4 12.59 53
Plantations 18 18 2.3 20.79 44
       Services 6 5 0.3 3.86 80
Banking and Finance 33 31 16.8 9.00 13
Diversified holdings 13 12 15.7 10.87 58
Beverage Food and 
Tobacco 18 17
12.4
8.25
41
Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals 9 9
1.1
34.41
33
Constructions and 
Engineering 3 3
0.8
15.06
67
Footwear and Textiles 3 23 0.5 10.40 0
Health care 6 6 2.7 3.23 50
Information Technology 1 1 0.1 56.91 0
Investment Trusts 7 6 0.8 11.46 83
Land and Property 20 18 2.1 15.12 52
Manufacturing 32 28 6.9 17.79 32
Motors 6 6 2.7 85.66 33
Oil Palms 5 5 2.5 3.40 100
Power and Energy 3 3 2.3 15.87 0
Stores Suppliers 5 5 0.5 7.75 40
Telecommunication 2 2 21.4 28.81 0
Total/Average 231 212 5% 19.68% 43%
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TABLE 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1. Earning Per Share (08/09) 6.15 19.13 1                   
2. Earning Per Share (07/08) 7.19 13.46 .51 1                  
3. CEO Duality .44 .50 .06 -.09 1                 
4. CEO - Family Ties .52 .50 .01 -.13 .76 1                
5. CEO - Committee Participation .43 .50 -.03 .04 .10 -.04 1               
6. Board Shareholdings 10.46 20.13 .12 .05 -.09 .06 -.06 1              
7. Freq. of Board Meetings 6.82 3.27 .13 .17 -.21 -.17 .11 .14 1             
8. CEO Tenure 2.05 .95 .07 .18 .07 .14 .03 .10 -.05 1            
9. # of Executive Directors 2.76 1.68 .01 .14 .06 .13 -.08 .14 .05 .06 1           
10. # of Non-Executive Directors 4.99 2.26 -.09 .04 -.24 -.18 -.05 .11 .29 -.09 -.39 1          
11. # of Independent Directors 2.61 1.40 .04 .02 -.18 -.12 -.02 -.02 .30 -.15 .07 .53 1         
12. # of Board Committees 1.58 .85 .15 .17 -.17 -.14 -.14 .11 .19 .00 .03 .40 .46 1        
13. Executive Team Size 15.10 7.99 .12 .11 -.12 -.16 .09 -.03 .34 .11 .05 .18 .21 .15 1       
14. Chairman Busyness .50 .501 -.02 -.14 -.03 -.08 .47 -.05 .14 .02 -.11 -.06 .01 -.04 .18 1      
15. Firm Age 3.40 .62 .16 .13 .13 .17 .04 .07 -.04 .16 .10 -.20 .02 .06 .07 .09 1     
16. Firm Size 7.49 1.16 .01 .23 -.34 -.28 .03 -.07 .25 -.09 .06 .34 .26 .30 .19 -.06 -.14 1    
17. Current Ratio 3.64 9.73 .16 -.05 .19 .16 .02 -.10 -.17 -.01 -.05 -.20 -.06 -.08 -.07 .01 .14 -.24 1   
18. Debt Ratio 147.73 376.79 -.19 .11 -.14 -.24 .16 -.04 .38 -.05 -.01 .23 .11 .10 .33 .02 -.05 .21 -.05 1  
19. Industry - Manufacturing .19 .39 -.04 -.08 .08 .11 .20 .07 .27 .06 -.15 .16 .15 -.03 .18 .21 .09 -.28 .10 .20 1
20. Industry - Service .61 .49 -.02 .06 .06 .01 -.08 -.11 -.24 -.09 .16 -.15 -.13 -.09 -.15 -.27 -.02 .24 -.03 -.09 -.61 1
n= 212. Standardized correlation coefficients ≥ .14 in the table were significant at p < .05. (2-tailed)
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TABLE 3
Results of Regression Analyses
n= 212. Standardized coefficients are reported.
†p< .10, *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Control CEO tenure -.044 -.047 -.033 -.007
# of Executive directors -.153* -.158* -.224** -.264***
# of Non-executive directors -.215* -.214* -.288*** -.320***
# of Independent directors .085 .091 .118 .146†
# of Board subcommittees .113 .113 .089 .077
Executive team size .180** 181** .157* .160*
Chairman busyness -.030 -.011 -.002 .090
Firm age (log) .031 .026 .018 .018
Firm size (log) -.032 .-013 .001 -.041
Past firm performance(log) .502*** .507*** .491*** .448***
Current ratio .143* .136* .163** .201***
Debt ratio -.278*** -.273*** -.303*** -.299***
Industry - manufacturing -.067 -.080 -.041 -.013
Industry - service -.032 -.043 -.061 -.068
Independent CEO duality .075 .183* .294**
Moderating CEO - family ties -.094 -.150
CEO - subcommittee participation -.055 -.080
Boards’ shareholdings .163** .194**
Freq. of board meetings .188** 250***
Interaction CEO duality x CEO - family ties -.139*
CEO duality x CEO - subcommittee 
participation
-.141*
CEO duality x board shareholdings .128*
CEO duality x freq. of board 
meetings
.133†
R2 37.1 37.6 42.9 47.4
Adjusted R2 32.6 32.8 37.2 41.0
F 8.30*** 7.86*** 7.59*** 7.37***
∆ R2 .371 .005 .053 .045
F for ∆ R2 8.30*** 1.43 4.50** 4.05**
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FIGURE 1
Two-way interaction between CEO duality and CEO family ties
on firm performance
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FIGURE 2
Two-way interaction between CEO duality and CEO participation in
board subcommittees on firm performance
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FIGURE 3
Two-way interaction between CEO duality and board shareholdings
on firm performance
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FIGURE 4
Two-way interaction between CEO duality and board meetings frequency
on firm performance
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